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Abstract. We develop an equilibrium sequential search model which includes most of
the literature as special cases. In particular, the model can accommodate heterogeneity in
buyers’ search costs and demand functions and ﬁrms’ cost functions, with general demand
and cost functions. We identify conditions which ensure existence of equilibrium in pure
strategies, utilizing recent progress in the theory of large games by Khan and Sun. These
conditions elucidate the essential structure of equilibrium search models. Although we
focus on sequential search, our methodology can be used for other classes of equilibrium
search models as well.
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Equilibrium search models have been used to study a wide variety of issues in labor eco-
nomics, macroeconomics, and microeconomics. In microeconomics alone, a partial list
would include: the existence of wage and price dispersion [2, 16, 17], advertising [18], mar-
ket microstructure and the role of middlemen [20], and the eﬀects of wage and price controls
[15]. Despite numerous applications, the equilibrium search literature remains fragmented,
containing many diﬀerent variants of the basic model, each adapted to deal with some spe-
ciﬁc applied problem. It seems that little progress has been made in analyzing the general
structure of this important class of models.
E.g., in Reinganum [16] buyers are identical and ﬁrms diﬀer only with respect to
their constant marginal costs. In that model, the existence and character of equilibrium
is not an issue, since the equilibrium distribution (cdf) of prices is induced directly by the
cdf of ﬁrms’ costs. At the opposite extreme, in Rob [17] ﬁrms are identical but buyers
may have diﬀerent search costs. Although Rob’s existence proof is ingenious, it does not
seem to extend to more general equilibrium search models, particularly those where ﬁrms
have diﬀerent cost functions. The model in Carlson and McAfee [2] allows heterogeneity in
buyers’ search costs and ﬁrms’ constant marginal costs, but under very speciﬁc assumptions
in order to explicitly solve the model. The most general model seems to be B´ enabou [1]
which signiﬁcantly extends [2], essentially combining the Reinganum and Rob models.
B´ enabou characterizes the equilibrium cdf of prices as a ﬁxed point of a certain map, but
is unable to prove existence for reasons discussed in the working paper version of [1].
In this paper, we develop an equilibrium search model which signiﬁcantly extends
[1] and prove existence of equilibrium in pure strategies. The proof is made possible by
recent progress in the theory of large games by Khan and Sun [9]. We prove existence
under two distinct sets of assumptions. We call the ﬁrst set of assumptions standard,
since they generalize the B´ enabou model directly. We call the second set general, since
they allow heterogeneity in buyers’ search costs and demand functions as well as ﬁrms’ cost
functions, with very general cost and demand functions. Although the general assumptions
seem much weaker than the standard ones from an economic point of view, they are
1mathematically distinct. Furthermore, the standard assumptions are analytically tractable
and have proved useful in applications.
In the next section, we present the model and prove existence of equilibrium in pure
strategies. Section 3 concludes.
2. A General Model
Let R and R+ denote the spaces of real numbers and nonnegative real numbers, respec-
tively. We ﬁrst characterize the demand side of the market. Let (I,I,µI) be a ﬁnite
measure space, where I is the set of buyers, I is a σ-algebra of subsets of I, and µI is a
ﬁnite measure on I, with µI(I) = N > 0. We assume there is a price ¯ p > 0 above which
buyers will not pay. Let ˜ p < 0 be the shut-down price chosen by ﬁrms which elect not
to operate. The space of feasible prices is therefore P = [0, ¯ p] ∪ {˜ p}, which is compact.
Let X be a set of nonincreasing functions x : R+ → R+ with the following properties:
(i) x(p) = 0 for all p > ¯ p, (ii) Z(x) = inf{p ∈ R+ |x(p) = 0} > 0, and (iii) there exists
a Lebesgue integrable function g : [0, ¯ p] → R+ such that for all x ∈ X, x(p) ≤ g(p) for
all p ∈ [0, ¯ p]. We assume g(0) > 0; otherwise, the model is trivial. By theorem 3.7 in
[6, p. 228], each x ∈ X is bounded and a.e. diﬀerentiable, so we may endow X with the
supremum metric. The demand side of the market is then characterized by a measurable
function B : I → R+ ×X which assigns to each buyer i a nonnegative search cost s(i) and
demand function x(p|i) in X.1
A common assumption in the equilibrium search literature is that all buyers have the
same demand curve, which is perfectly inelastic at one unit up to some maximum price
¯ p, after which quantity demanded is zero. The above framework allows buyers to have
diﬀerent maximum prices, bounded above by ¯ p, and can also handle more standard linear
demand curves, as well as diﬀerent demand functions of a very general nature. Assuming
the existence of a maximum price ¯ p > 0 is a simple way of “compactifying” the model.
For another way, see assumptions 1 in [12].
Let D be the set of all cdfs with support contained in P with the Prohorov metric.
1 Throughout the paper, metric space products are equipped with the product metric which metrizes
the product topology.
2Since P is compact, so is D. As it turns out, the cdf F ∈ D such that F(˜ p) = 1 (almost all
ﬁrms shut down) causes certain technical diﬃculties, so for the time being we work with
the subspace D<1 = {F ∈ D|F(˜ p) < 1}.
Let H : R × D<1 → R+ be deﬁned by
H(p|F) =

   
   
0 p < ˜ p
F(p)−F(˜ p)
1−F(˜ p) ˜ p ≤ p ≤ ¯ p
1 p > ¯ p.
(1)
H(p|F) is the cdf of prices charged by operating ﬁrms. As is well-known (e.g., see [1]),
under standard assumptions, a buyer with demand x and search cost s continues to search




x(p)H(p|F)dp ≤ s, (2)
where the left-hand side of (2) is the marginal beneﬁt of another search, and the right-
hand side is the marginal cost.2 Let γ : [0, ¯ p] × X × D<1 → R+ be deﬁned as in (2) and
z(F) = sup{p ∈ R|H(p|F) = 0} ≥ 0.
Proposition 1. γ is continuous. For any (x,F) ∈ X × D<1, γ is a.e. diﬀerentiable on
[0, ¯ p] (with respect to Lebesgue measure) with derivative x(r)H(r|F). It equals zero on
[0,z(F)], is increasing on [z(F),Z(x)] if z(F) < Z(x), and constant on [Z(x), ¯ p].
Figure 1 below depicts γ in bold.
Figure 1 Goes Here
If the search cost is s1, the buyer continues searching after observing prices p > r0, and
stops for all prices 0 ≤ p ≤ r0. Her reservation level is therefore r0. If the search cost is
s2 or s3, her reservation level is ¯ p, so she stops at the ﬁrst seller she visits. Generally, the
reservation level of a buyer with (x,s) is given by sup{r ∈ [0, ¯ p]|γ(r|x,F) ≤ s}.
Note that the reservation level is discontinuous at s2, since a small reduction in the
search cost would cause a disproportionately large drop in the reservation level from ¯ p
2 As usual, we assume the ﬁrst price quote is free. As in [19], the derivation of (2) assumes H(0|F) = 0,
which will be true in equilibrium. It is mathematically well-deﬁned regardless.
3to something less than Z(x). Furthermore, there may be a positive mass of buyers with
reservation level ¯ p. E.g., suppose all ﬁrms charge ¯ p. Since z(F) = ¯ p, all buyers have
reservation level ¯ p. To take another example, common in the literature, suppose all buyers
have the same γ as in Figure 1, because their demand functions are the same. Then all
buyers with search costs s ≥ s2 would have reservation level ¯ p.
It turns out that a positive mass of buyers with reservation level ¯ p causes certain
technical diﬃculties, so this problem must be ﬁnessed. To do this, we deﬁne Γ : R+ ×X ×





γ(r|x,F) 0 ≤ r ≤ ¯ p
γ(¯ p|x,F) + r − ¯ p r ≥ ¯ p.
(3)
I.e., we continuously paste a line of slope 1 to γ at the point (¯ p,γ(¯ p|x,F)). To see the
eﬀect of this, suppose all buyers have the same γ as in Figure 1, but are heterogeneous
with respect to their search costs. Before, all buyers with s ≥ s2 had reservation level
¯ p. Now, Γ spreads those buyers out above ¯ p. Since buyers with reservation levels greater
than ¯ p also stop at the ﬁrst store they visit, the economic situation is unchanged. We may
therefore deﬁne the reservation level of a buyer with (x,s) to be
r(s,x,F) = sup{r ≥ 0|Γ(r|x,F) ≤ s}. (4)
Although r is not continuous, it is measurable.
Proposition 2. Γ is continuous. The function r : R+ × X × D<1 → R+ deﬁned in (4)
is measurable. Let R : I × D → R+ be deﬁned by R(i,F) = r(B(i),F). Then R is also
measurable.
Most equilibrium search models assume (i) all buyers have the same diﬀerentiable
demand function and (ii) the cdf Q of search costs deﬁned by Q(s) = µI({i ∈ I |s(i) ≤
s})/N is absolutely continuous (AC), which is equivalent to representation by a pdf. These
assumptions guarantee that ﬁrms face continuous demand. The ﬁrst ensures that a small
change in the ﬁrm’s price would cause a small change in sales from existing customers,
while the second implies that the cdf of reservation levels deﬁned by G(r|F) = µI({i ∈
I |R(i,F) ≤ r})/N is AC (see the argument below), so G has no atoms. If G had an
4atom at r0, then a small increase in price above r0 would lead to a disproportionately large
reduction in the ﬁrm’s customer base. The following assumption generalizes the situation
considerably.
Assumption 1. (i) For each (r,F) ∈ R+×D<1, B−1(T(r,F)) is µI-null, where T(r,F) =
{(x,s) ∈ X × R+ |Γ(r|x,F) = s}. (ii) For each p ∈ [0, ¯ p), the set of all buyers whose
demand function is discontinuous at p is µI-null.
Assumption 1(ii) ensures the nonexistence of a positive mass of buyers having demand
functions which all jump down at some particular price, creating a discontinuity in ﬁrms’
demand there. 1(i) is equivalent to assuming G is continuous, although not necessarily
AC. However, we prefer the above statement since it refers directly to the primitives of the
model. To get a sense of what 1(i) entails, consider the set of buyers with reservation level
¯ p. For example, the buyer could have search cost s2 in Figure 1, which requires a special
relationship between the buyer’s demand function Z(x) and her search cost. 1(i) rules out
too much coordination of this type in the map B which assigns buyers their characteristics.
Note that 1(i) implies Q is continuous, although not necessarily AC. For example, suppose
all ﬁrms charge ¯ p. In that case, Γ equals zero on [0, ¯ p] and r − ¯ p on [¯ p,∞), so to ensure
that the mass of buyers with any particular reservation level r0 ≥ ¯ p is null, it is necessary
to assume that the mass with search cost s(i) = r0 − ¯ p is null.
We now turn to the supply side of the market. Let (J,J,µJ) be a probability space,
where we have normalized the mass of sellers to be one. A ﬁrm j is characterized by its cost
function C(y |j), where y is output. In the proof of proposition 3, we show that quantity
demanded is bounded above by some constant ¯ y, so let C be the set of all continuous
functions [0, ¯ y] → R+ with the supremum metric. The supply side of the market is then
characterized by a measurable function S : J → C, which assigns a cost function to each
ﬁrm. Note that we do not assume constant returns to scale or even that cost functions
are nondecreasing. A non-operating ﬁrm sets p = ˜ p and makes zero proﬁt. We assume
C(y |j) ≡ 0 for a positive mass α of ﬁrms, and that indiﬀerent ﬁrms choose to operate, so
in equilibrium the mass α will choose to operate, and F(˜ p) ≤ 1 − α.
Since the structure of ﬁrms’ demand schedule is well-known, we present a heuristic
5derivation. Suppose ﬁrm j charges the price p. Firm j’s potential buyers are those with
reservation levels p and above. Any such buyer i will search until she ﬁnds a price R(i,F)
or below. The mass of such ﬁrms is H(R(i,F)|F). Hence, j expects to sell
x(p|i)
H(R(i,F)|F)







At this point, we have no guarantee that the integral in (5) is well-deﬁned, since the
denominator in the integrand could be zero, and because the integrand becomes arbitrarily
large for small reservation levels. Assumption 2 below eliminates these problems.
Assumption 2. There exists an ¯ s > 0 such that Q(¯ s) = 0.
From now on, we refer to assumptions 1 and 2 as the general assumptions.
The demand function in (5) is very general, and is not the usual one in the literature.
To obtain the latter, we must make some strong assumptions.
Standard Assumptions. All buyers have the same demand function x ∈ X, continuous
on [0, ¯ p]. Furthermore, Q is AC with bounded continuous pdf q and Q(0) = q(0) = 0.
We are free to work with either the reservation levels determined by γ or Γ, and in this







Now i enters only via R(i,F), which is measurable by proposition 2. We may therefore







It may appear we have a division-by-zero problem when p < z(F), but since [p,z(F)] is
G-null, the integral is zero on that interval, and we may deﬁne the integrand as we like
there. Since all buyers have the same γ, G(r|F) = Q(γ(r|x,F)), which is AC since γ is
nondecreasing in r, and γ and Q are AC. To ﬁnd its pdf g, we diﬀerentiate a.e. to obtain
g(r|F) = G0(r|F) = Q0(γ(r|x,F))γ0(r|x,F) = q(γ(r|x,F))x(r)H(r|F). (8)










which is essentially the same as that in [1]. Note that q(0) = 0 is necessary to ensure the
integral is zero on [p,z(F)] when p < z(F). Under the standard assumptions, the integrand
in (9) is well-behaved, so all integrability and boundedness problems have disappeared. So
the standard assumptions eﬀectively mask these issues.
Proposition 3. (i) Under the standard assumptions, D : [0, ¯ p] × D<1 → R+ deﬁned by
(9) is continuous. (ii) Alternatively, under the general assumptions, D in (5) is continuous.
Although the general assumptions seem much weaker than the standard assumptions
from an economic point of view, they are not more general mathematically, since the stan-
dard assumptions do not require assumption 2. Furthermore, the standard assumptions are
computationally convenient and, until now, most applications of the equilibrium sequential
search model have used some version of them.
We have not shown that D is continuous on the whole space D, which seems diﬃcult
to do. We do know, however, that D is continuous on [0, ¯ p] × D≤1−α, where 0 < α < 1 is
the mass of ﬁrms which produce at zero cost, and D≤1−α = {F ∈ D|F(˜ p) ≤ 1−α}. Since
[0, ¯ p] × D is compact Hausdorﬀ and D≤1−α is closed,3 we may apply the Tietze-Urysohn
extension theorem [4, p. 48] to obtain a continuous, nonnegative extension [0, ¯ p]×D → R+,
which we also denote by D. Since the equilibrium cdf of prices will belong to D≤1−α, the
non-economic region D>1−α will play no further role in the analysis.





pD(p|F) − C(D(p|F)) p ∈ [0, ¯ p]
0 p = ˜ p.
(10)
Let P be the space of continuous functions P × D → R with the supremum metric, and
Π : J → P be deﬁned by Π(j) = π(p,F,S(j)).
3 Take any sequence {Fn} in D≤1−α which converges to some F ∈ D. In the proof of proposition 1,
we show that Fn(˜ p) → F(˜ p). Since Fn(˜ p) ≤ 1 − α for all n, F(˜ p) ≤ 1 − α, so F ∈ D≤1−α.
7Proposition 4. Under either the general or standard assumptions, π is continuous and
Π is measurable.
A search market equilibrium is a measurable price proﬁle f : J → P such that
Π(j)(f(j),F) ≥ Π(j)(p,F) for all p ∈ P and j ∈ J, where F ∈ D is the cdf induced
by f. Until now, we have only assumed (J,J,µJ) is a probability space. In the following
theorem, the main result of the paper, it is assumed to be a uniform Loeb probability space,
as discussed below.
Theorem. If (J,J,µJ) is a uniform Loeb probability space, then a search market equi-
librium exists under either the general or standard assumptions.
Note that the uniform Loeb probability space hypothesis applies to both the standard
and general case. It is beyond the scope of this paper to give a precise deﬁnition of the
uniform Loeb probability space; see [3, 5, 8]. Our discussion here is completely informal.
One ﬁrst constructs the space of hyperreal numbers (the ultrapower construction), which
extends R to include, for example, inﬁnite or unlimited natural numbers, which are greater
than any standard natural number. Let J be a hyperﬁnite set with cardinality N, where
N is an unlimited natural number; e.g., J = {1,2,...,N}. Let νJ({j}) = 1/N for all
j ∈ J. This is an extension of the usual uniform distribution on a ﬁnite set, in which
each player has inﬁnitesimal weight. It is not a standard probability space because, for
one thing, 1/N is not a real number. We ﬁx this by deﬁning µJ = sh νJ, where sh is
the standard part or shadow map which assigns the nearest real number to each (limited)
hyperreal. Now, each player has measure zero. The uniform Loeb probability space then
follows from the standard outer measure construction applied to (J,µJ). It satisﬁes the
usual deﬁnition of an atomless probability space, and is the nonstandard analogue of the
uniform distribution.
The above theorem is now a direct application of the following result, which is a
simpliﬁed version of theorem 1 in [9], stated in a form suitable for further applications to
equilibrium search models.
Theorem. (Khan and Sun) Let J be a uniform Loeb probability space, P ⊆ R be compact
and nonempty, D be the set of cdfs with support contained in P with the Prohorov metric,
8and P the set of continuous functions P × D → R with the supremum metric. If Π :
J → P is Loeb measurable, there exists a Loeb measurable function f : J → P such that
Π(j)(f(j),F) ≥ Π(j)(p,F) for all p ∈ P and j ∈ J, where F ∈ D is the cdf induced by f.
Note that the Khan-Sun theorem is false for the unit interval with Lebesgue measure:
see the counterexample in [11] and further elaborated in [7]. Although the proof of the
Khan-Sun theorem involves essentially classical reasoning, certain pieces of the argument
related to the distribution of the best response correspondence break down for Lebesgue
measure spaces. It remains an open question as to whether the theorem in this paper is
valid for Lebesgue measure spaces. If so, it seems the proof will have to involve an original
line of attack.
In the context of equilibrium search models, most of the focus is on the cdf of prices
and comparative statics, not the space of players. Any mathematical model for J with
appropriate economic content is therefore suitable. In particular, the only feature of the
unit interval with Lebesgue measure with any economic content is that each player has
measure zero, which is also a feature of the uniform Loeb probability space. The bottom
line is that researchers can simply assume the latter, and then focus on those objects of
primary interest such as the cdf of prices, which is completely standard. Furthermore,
most equilibrium search models have the same general structure covered by the Khan-Sun
theorem, so one can use the present paper as a road map for proving existence in other
equilibrium search models, with diﬀerent search technologies and equilibrium concepts.
Another approach is to assume buyers’ search rules only depend on ﬁnitely many
moments of the cdf of prices, as in [12]. In that case, the theorem in [14] guarantees
existence, even for Lebesgue measure spaces. In this sense, the latter are game-theoretically
incomplete because an equilibrium exists for any ﬁnite number of moments, but not in the
limit.
3. Conclusion
In this paper, we developed an equilibrium sequential search model which includes most
of the literature as special cases. In particular, the model can accommodate heterogeneity
in buyers’ search costs and demand functions and ﬁrms’ cost functions, with very general
9cost and demand functions. We identiﬁed conditions which ensure existence of equilibrium
in pure strategies, and elucidate the essential structure of this important class of models.
The impetus for our work was provided by recent progess in the theory of large games by
Khan and Sun [9]. Although we focused on sequential search, our methodology can be
used to prove existence for other classes of equilibrium search models as well.
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1
The integrand in (2) is a.e. diﬀerentiable and bounded above by g(0), hence integrable. We
now prove γ is continuous. We can re-write it as γ(r|x,F) =
R
[0,¯ p] x(p)H(p|F)1[0,r](p)dp,
where 1[0,r](p) is the indicator function which equals 1 when 0 ≤ p ≤ r and 0 otherwise.
Let (rn,xn,Fn) → (r,x,F). Consider the sequence {xn(p)H(p|Fn)1[0,rn](p)} of integrable
functions. Since xn → x in the supremum metric, xn(p) → x(p) pointwise on [0, ¯ p]. We
now show that H(p|Fn) → H(p|F) a.e. on [0, ¯ p]. By theorem 11.1.2 in [4, p. 304],
Fn → F in the Prohorov metric iﬀ Fn(p) → F(p) at all p ∈ R where F is continuous.
Since F is nondecreasing, its discontinuities are at most countable. We therefore have
only to show that Fn(˜ p) → F(˜ p). Choose any p0 such that ˜ p < p0 < 0. Since F is
continuous at p0 (it’s locally constant there), Fn(p0) → F(p0). But Fn(p0) = Fn(˜ p) and
F(p0) = F(˜ p). The sequence {1[0,rn]} of indicator functions converges pointwise to 1[0,r]
except possibly at p = r, hence a.e. So xn(p)H(p|Fn)1[0,rn](p) → x(p)H(p|F)1[0,r](p)
pointwise a.e. Finally, xn(p)H(p|Fn)1[0,rn](p) ≤ g(p), so we can apply the dominated
convergence theorem. The diﬀerentiability claim follows from one of the fundamental
theorems of calculus. The rest is clear.
Proof of Proposition 2
We ﬁrst prove Γ is continuous. Let (rn,xn,Fn) → (r,x,F). If r < ¯ p, then rn < ¯ p after
ﬁnitely many terms. The result then follows by continuity of γ. If r > ¯ p, then rn > ¯ p after
ﬁnitely many terms. As (xn,Fn) → (x,F), γ(z |xn,Fn) → γ(z |x,F) uniformly on [0, ¯ p],
10by corollary 5.4 in [10, p. 287]. Hence, γ(¯ p|xn,Fn) → γ(¯ p|x,F) and the result follows. If
r = ¯ p, then convergence occurs for rn on both sides of r.
To prove the measurability of r(s,x,F), let {Γn} be a sequence of functions Γn :
R+ × X × D<1 → R deﬁned by Γn(r|x,F) = Γ(r|x,F) − (1/[n(r + 1)]). Each Γn is
clearly continuous and increasing in r. For each n, deﬁne rn : X × R+ × D<1 → R+ as
the unique solution rn(x,s,F) to the equation Γn(z |x,F) = s in the variable z.
Lemma 1. For each n, rn is continuous.
Proof. Let (xk,sk,Fk) → (x,s,F). We must show that rk
n ≡ rn(xk,sk,Fk) → rn ≡
rn(x,s,F). As (xk,Fk) → (x,F), Γn(z |xk,Fk) → Γn(z |x,F) uniformly on R+. By def-
inition, s = Γn(rn |x,F) and sk = Γn(rk
n |xk,Fk). Since Γn is increasing and continuous,
for any  > 0 there exists a δ > 0 such that |Γn(z |x,F) − Γn(rn |x,F)| < δ implies
z ∈ (rn − ,rn + ). For k suﬃciently large, |Γn(z |xk,Fk) − Γn(z |x,F)| < δ/2 for all
z ≥ 0 by uniform convergence. Since sk → s, |Γn(rk
n |xk,Fk) − Γn(rn |x,F)| < δ/2
for suﬃciently large k. By the triangle inequality, |Γn(rk
n |x,F) − Γn(rn |x,F)| < δ so
rk
n ∈ (rn − ,rn + ) for suﬃciently large k.
Since Γn converges uniformly to Γ from below, {rn} converges pointwise to r. Since
continuous functions are measurable, and a pointwise limit of measurable functions is
measurable, we are done. The rest follows because a composition of measurable functions
is measurable.
Proof of Proposition 3.




H(R(i,F)|F) dµI, where 1R(i,F)≥p(i) is
the indicator function which equals 1 when R(i,F) ≥ p and zero otherwise.






Proof. Fix (p,F) ∈ [0, ¯ p] × D<1. We begin by showing that the denominator in (A1) is
positive, and the whole expression is bounded above by a positive constant. For those i
11such that R(i,F) ≥ ¯ p, the denominator is 1 and g(0) is the upper bound. If R(i,F) < ¯ p,
consider
R r
z(F) x(p|i)H(p|F)dp = s. Since x(p|i)H(p|F) ≤ g(0), a lower bound for
R(i,F) is determined by
R r
z(F) g(0)dp = g(0)[r − z(F)] = ¯ s (see assumption 2) or ¯ r =
z(F) + ¯ s
g(0). Hence, R(i,F) ≥ ¯ r > z(F) and the upper bound is
g(0)
H(¯ r |F). To ﬁnish the
proof, we show (A1) is (I,I)-measurable. By proposition 2, 1R(i,F)≥p(i) is measurable.
The denominator in (A1) is measurable, since H and R are measurable. It remains to
show that x(p|i) is measurable. Fix any k ∈ R+. Let X(p) = {x ∈ X |x(p) ≤ k}. If
X(p) = ∅, it is closed. Otherwise, let {xn} be a sequence in X(p) which converges to
x ∈ X. Since xn → x, xn(p) → x(p). Since xn(p) ≤ k, x(p) ≤ k, and X(p) is closed.
Hence {i ∈ I |x(p|i) ≤ k} = B−1(R+ × X(p)) is measurable.
To prove continuity, let (pn,Fn) → (p,F). The expression “for a.a.i” means “for µI-almost
all i”. By assumption 1(ii), x(pn |i) → x(p|i) for a.a.i.
Lemma 3. R(i,Fn) → R(i,F) for a.a.i.
Proof. We consider only those i such that R(i,F) 6= ¯ p, which is a set of full measure by
assumption 1(i). Let xi be i’s demand function. There are two cases. If Z(xi) ≤ z(F)
then Γ(r|xi,F) = 0 for all r ∈ [0, ¯ p], and is increasing with slope 1 thereafter. Since
s(i) > ¯ s > 0 for a.a.i, R(i,F) > ¯ p for almost all such i. Now suppose z(F) < Z(xi). We
cannot have R(i,F) = Z(xi) unless Z(xi) = ¯ p (see Figure 1), which we have ruled out.
So either z(F) < ¯ r ≤ R(i,F) < Z(xi) or R(i,F) > ¯ p. Since Γ(r|xi,F) is increasing on
[¯ r,Z(xi)) and (¯ p,∞), and Γ(r|xi,Fn) converges uniformly to Γ(r|xi,F) on those intervals,
the result follows.
Lemma 4. H(R(i,Fn)|Fn) → H(R(i,F)|F) for a.a.i.
Proof. In the proof of proposition 1, we showed that Fn(˜ p) → F(˜ p), so all we need to do is
show that Fn(R(i,Fn)) → F(R(i,F)). Since F has at most countably many discontinuities,
we may enumerate them as {wk}. For each k, the set of all i such that R(i,F) = wk is null
by assumption 1(i). Since a countable union of null sets is null, the set of all i such that
F is discontinuous at R(i,F) is also null. Fix an i such that F is continuous at R(i,F)
and R(i,Fn) → R(i,F). Fix  > 0. Since F is continuous at R(i,F), there is an interval
12(r1,r2) such that R(i,F) ∈ (r1,r2) and |F(r) − F(R(i,F))| < 
6 for all r ∈ (r1,r2). By
choosing r1 and r2 closer to R(i,F), if necessary, we may assume F is continuous at r1
and r2, and the previous inequality holds on [r1,r2]. Let N be the set of positive integers.
Since Fn(r1) → F(r1) and Fn(r2) → F(r2), choose N1 ∈ N such that |Fn(r1)−F(r1)| < 
3
for all n ≥ N1 and |Fn(r2) − F(r2)| < 
3 for all n ≥ N2. Since R(i,Fn) → R(i,F), choose
N3 ∈ N such that R(i,Fn) ∈ (r1,r2) for all n ≥ N3. Let N4 = max{N1,N2,N3}. For all
n ≥ N4, F(r1)− 
3 < Fn(r1) ≤ Fn(R(i,Fn)) ≤ Fn(r2) < F(r2)+ 
3. Furthermore, F(r1) ≤
F(R(i,F)) ≤ F(r2). So |Fn(R(i,Fn)) − F(R(i,F))| < [F(r2) + 
3 ] − [F(r1) − 
3 ] < .
Lemma 5. 1R(i,Fn)≥pn(i) → 1R(i,F)≥p(i) for a.a.i. In fact, 1R(i,Fn)≥pn(i) = 1R(i,F)≥p(i)
after ﬁnitely many terms for a.a.i.
Proof. Fix i such that R(i,F) 6= p and R(i,Fn) → R(i,F). If p < R(i,F), then
pn < R(i,Fn) after ﬁnitely many n. If R(i,F) < p, then R(i,Fn) < pn after ﬁnitely
many n.
We have shown that for a.a.i., 1R(i,Fn)≥pn(i)
x(pn |i)
H(R(i,Fn)|Fn) is well-deﬁned after ﬁnitely
many terms, and converges to 1R(i,F)≥p(i)
x(p|i)
H(R(i,F)|F). By the dominated convergence
theorem, we will be done if we can show that
x(pn |i)
H(R(i,Fn)|Fn) is bounded above by some
constant for a.a.i. after ﬁnitely many terms. For any n, for those i such that R(i,Fn) ≥ ¯ p
the upper bound is g(0). Now choose z(F) < ˆ r < ¯ r such that F is continuous at ˆ r, so
H(ˆ r|Fn) → H(ˆ r|F). Fix  > 0. We may assume 0 < H(ˆ r|F) − . Choose N1 ∈ N
such that 0 < H(ˆ r|F) −  < H(ˆ r|Fn) < H(ˆ r|F) +  for all n ≥ N1. Choose any i
such that R(i,Fn) < ¯ p and R(i,Fn) → R(i,F). Choose 2 > 0 and N2 ∈ N such that
ˆ r < R(i,F) − 2 < R(i,Fn) < R(i,F) + 2 for all n ≥ N2. Let N3 = max{N1,N2}.




H(ˆ r |F)−, which completes the proof of (ii).
To prove (i), write (9) as D(p|F) = x(p)N
R
r∈[0,¯ p] 1p≤r≤¯ p(r)q(γ(r|x,F))x(r)dr. Let
K be an upper bound for q. Viewed as a function of r, the integrand is a.e. continuous and
bounded above by Kg(0), therefore integrable. For any r0, γ(r0 |x,Fn) → γ(r0 |x,F), so
q(γ(r0 |x,Fn)) → q(γ(r0 |x,F)) since q is continuous. The proof that 1pn≤r≤¯ p → 1p≤r≤¯ p
pointwise a.e. is similar to that for lemma 5 above. Finally, 1pn≤r≤¯ p(r)q(γ(r|x,Fn))x(r)
13is also bounded above by Kg(0), so the dominated convergence theorem completes the
proof.
Proof of Proposition 4.
We ﬁrst show that π is continuous. Let (pn,Fn,Cn) → (p,F,C). Suppose p 6= ˜ p. Then
after ﬁnitely many terms, pn ∈ [0, ¯ p]. We have D(pn |Fn) → D(p|F) under either set
of assumptions. By theorem 5.3 in [10, p. 287], the evaluation map is continuous, so
Cn(D(pn |Fn)) → C(D(p|F)), and we are done. If p = ˜ p then pn = ˜ p after ﬁnitely many
terms. By corollary 5.4 in [10, p. 287], the function C → P deﬁned by C 7→ π(p,F,C) is
continuous. Hence, the composition with the measurable function S is measurable.
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15Figure 1.  The Marginal Benefit γ of Another Search. 
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